The Bar Association of Sri Lanka (BASL) has mounted an aggressive campaign against proposed constitutional amendments to extend judicial retirement ages, framing the reform as an existential threat to the rule of law. Yet, in an expansive, 1-hour and 24-minute broadcast interview defending this stance, the leadership of the BASL committed a fatal omission: not once was it explained how or why extending a judge’s statutory tenure actually threatens judicial independence.
Instead of delivering a structural critique, the Bar’s leadership offered empty warnings of a vague constitutional crisis, relying heavily on a distraction: the fact that the incumbent Chief Justice—scheduled to retire in December 2026—would be the initial beneficiary of the change. But the timing of a statutory amendment changes nothing. Whenever a retirement limit is extended across an entire institution, someone must inevitably be the first person to benefit. That is a basic logical truth, not a constitutional violation.
If the BASL is not opposed to the underlying concept of modernizing judicial tenure, crying foul over the immediate beneficiary is a red herring. Strip away this manufactured outrage, and the true motive comes into sharp focus: the BASL views any attempt to stabilize judicial tenure not as a threat to the bench, but as a direct assault on the Bar’s abusive, long-standing iron grip over Sri Lanka’s judicial apparatus.
The Manufactured Crisis vs. Commonwealth Reality
In the 84-minute interview, the Bar’s leadership built a classic straw man argument—one completely unbacked by international precedent, empirical data, or basic policy rationale. Modernizing retirement ages is not an attack on the bench; it is a standard, evidence-based tool for managing institutional capacity used across mature democracies.
- The United Kingdom: Facing severe trial backlogs and a shortage of experienced jurists, the UK Parliament passed the Public Service Pensions and Judicial Offices Act 2022, raising the mandatory judicial retirement age from 70 back to 75. Retaining proven senior talent was recognized as a practical necessity, not an erosion of independence.
- Canada: Under the Constitution Act, 1867, federally appointed judges serve until age 75. Canada pairs this cap with a robust supernumerary framework under the Judges Act, enabling senior judges to maintain a reduced trial docket while making room for full-time appointments.
In neither jurisdiction does extending a judge’s statutory tenure make them subservient to the executive. Judges do not lose their impartiality simply because the law permits them to serve their country longer. To suggest otherwise—while failing to articulate a single mechanism of compromise across an hour and twenty-four minutes of airtime—is not legal analysis; it is political theater.
Breaking the Monopoly
Why is the BASL fighting a routine policy reform that aligns Sri Lanka with established Commonwealth norms?
The answer lies in power and leverage. Rapid, mandatory turnover at early retirement caps creates a revolving door on the bench. Constant vacancies foster an ecosystem of informal influence, judicial jockeying, and administrative leverage where senior members of the Bar can exercise outsized control over the bench’s trajectory.
Extending tenure stabilizes the judiciary, preserves vital institutional memory, insulates sitting jurists from post-retirement anxieties, and disrupts this cycle of influence. By weaponizing the concept of “judicial independence” to fight a standard capacity-building measure—and hiding behind the distraction of who retires first—the BASL is using a hollow shield to protect its entrenched institutional monopoly.
Policy reform must be built on evidence, not manufactured panic. When an 84-minute interview cannot produce a single coherent sentence on how extended service harms the judiciary, the conclusion is inescapable: the debate is not about protecting the bench—it is about preserving control.
Viresh Fernando is a lawyer and political analyst in Toronto, Canada
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